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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
8TATE OF UTAH,
In the IntereSJt of:
BABY GIRL McMURTREY,

Case No.

vs.
JAMES N. THOMAS,

11607
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Second District Juvenile Coulit, the Honorable
Regnal W. Garff presiding, terminated a11 parental rights
of the appellant James N. Thomas, in his daughter, Baby
Gil•] McMurtrey. This is an appeal from that order.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A petition for the permanenrt dep:civabion of all parental rights of Baby Girl McMurtrey was filed in rthe Second District Juvenile Court on December 23, 1968. Aflter
a hearing on February 26, 1969, the matter was taken
under advisement by the Court. On March 7, 1969 appellant filed a petiltion reaffirming his paternity and request-
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ing custody of the child. By Decree and Order enterer:
April 3, 1969, all parental rights of both the appellant anri
mother of the child \Vere permanently terminated. Custiid"
of ithe child was given the Division of Family Services un
til placement in a suitable adoptive home.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Juvenile Cuu 1,
Decree.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent accepts appellant's Statement of Fact
with one major reservation. Appellant asserts that th,
Juvenile Court's sole basis for terminating appellant's parental rights in Baby Girl McMurtrey was that he was nrit
the legal father of the child. Respondent would add the
following facts which modify this assertion. The Juveni],
Court was well acquainted with appellant James N. Thomas
as evidenced by this language taken from the Order of tl11
Juvenile Court denying custody to appellant (R. 46).
". . . although Mr. Thomas is the putafa
father, he is not the
father and, therefore, ha:
no
rights to the child; FURTHER, this Coun
has prevfous,ly deprived Mr. Thomas of custody 0
two oither children, Vincent Andre Thomas ana
Keith Antoine Thomas, Case Nos. 205941 and
205942; said action was taken on September n
1965; since that time the children have continud
to live in foster homes and Court action has beet:
required to for0e support payments from l\Ir.
Thomas on behalf of the children·' he still io.s unablt.
to provide for these two children after 31/2 years o;
1

•

foster case; FURTHER, it would be contrary to the
interest of the above child ito follow the same foster
care pattern as these other two children."
This Order wa·s entered the same day as the Findings of
Fact and Decree terminating appellant's parental rights.
Judge Garff specifically found that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate its parents' rights in it.
SPc Findings of Fact (R. 44).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
TI-IE JUVENILE COURT PROPERLY TERMINATED A P P E L L A N T ' S PARENTAL
RIGHTS IN BABY GIRL McMURTREY.
A.

THE JUVENILE COURT HAS THE
POWER TO TERMINATE PARENTAL
RIGHTS AND THE EXERCISE OF THAT
POWER WAS PROPER UNDER THE
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE.

Appellant asserts that the Juvenile Court cannolt apply stafotes other than those enacted as a part of the J uvenile Com'l; Act and since (according to appellant) the sole
basis for terminating appellant's parental rights in this
case was Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Ann.,*
Juvenile
Comit exceeded its authority. The logical responses are
(1) that the Juvenrile Court can apply any statute in Utah

-

'The issue of whether the rewording of Utah Code Ann. § 78·30-4
by the 1965 legislature changed the meaning of that statute will be
discussed under subsection (B) infra.
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Code Annotated in
·of the caises within its juris.
diction, and (2) that Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 was not
the sole ba•sis for terminating appellant's parental rights.
Appellant's contention that the Juvenile Court mus:
decide its cases applying only the statutes found in Section,
55-10-63 through 55-10-123, coHectively known as thr
J uvenri.le Court Aot, is too unsiound to require rebuttal.
Appellant admits that this Court has never held that the
Juvenile Court must proceed so1'ely on ltheir own statutes
and respondent has not seen any other authority that woulu
support such a contention. The Juvenile Court must act
within the Constitution of the Staite of Utah and also with.
in the statutes enacted under the Constitution unless thert
is a conflict with a provision of the Juvenile Court Act. In
the situation where a provision of the Code confliots with
a proviS1ion of the Juvenile Court Act, the Juvenile Cami
i.s free to follow its own Act. Section 55-10-77 gives the
Juvenile Court broad jurisdiction over a number of
jects. If the Juvenile Court could apply oniJy the law
in ithe Juvenile Court Act, it would be severely handicappe<l
in disposing of the cases it has j urisdic:tion over under
55-10-77. Respondent requests that this Court rule tha1
the Juvenile Court i1s authorized to app'1y all the statutes ln
the Code and nat just those found in the JuvenHe Com1
Act.
I

I

Appellant repeatedly asserts thait the sole basis foi
terminating his parental rights was that he was not the
legal father of Baby Girl McMul'trey. The record indicate;
otherwise. In 1961 this Court held that Mr. Thomas

I
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no parental rights in another illegitimate CJhild begotten
by him. See Thomas V. Children's Aid Society of Ogden,
12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P. 2d 1029 (1961). Undoubtedly Judge
Garff was aware of this faCJt and could have talmn judicial
notice of it.
Appellant places great emphasis on ,the pdl!icy of the
Juvenile Court Act of strengthening family ties whenever
possible. He emphasizes family ties (p. 13 orf Appellant's
Brief whereas in this case the emphasis should be on the
last two words whenever possible. In custody and termination of parental rights cases, two conflicting considerations
must be balanced out, i.e., ( 1) the superior rights of the
parent to his child and (2) the welfare of the child. The
parent, except where proven unfit, has rights superior to
all others in his CJhirld. However, the pri.ncipal and main
must alwayis be the welfare of the child. See
Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 P. 716 (1914). In
the situation where the famiJy is a going concern, more
weight is given to the righlts of the parent. However,
where, as here, ,the family is nort a normal goli.ng family, the
welfare of ,the child should be the sole criterion.
The Juvenile Court Act of 1965 provides:
"'Dhe court may decree a termin:a'ffion of 'al}i} parentwl ri.gh.ltJs with respect Ito one or both parents iif
the court finds that the parent or parents are unfit
or incompetent by reason of conduot or condition
seriously detrimental to the child. U. C. A. 55-10109 (1) (a).

ti

In the present ca'3e the mother and father of the child haii
been married to each other, but were not marnied at thi
time the child was conceived nor aJt the time the child wa,
born nor at the time the termination Order was entererl
The mother is emotionally incapable of caring for the chilU.
The father has been denied parental rights in another illedaughter and has been depPived of ithe custody of
two other children, which he is still unable to support. fr
short, this is not a normal going family. It was in the best
intere5t of Baby Girl McM urtrey to take her out of sud
a family. Judge Garff, being well informed of the fatt;
and circumstances in this case, acted within the authority
granted him by secition 55-10-109, Utah Code Ann. when
he terminated appellant's parental rights.
B.

THE FATHER OF AN ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD DID NOT ACQUIRE ANY NEW
RIGHTS IN RELATION TO SAID CHILD
BY THE 1966 AMENDMENT OF UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.

Prii.or to 1966, Utah Code Annotated, 78-30-4, read in
pertinent part:

"A legitimate child cannot be adopted without
the consent of its parents, if living, nor an illegiti·
mate chiild without the ·Clonsent of its mother, ii
living.... "
In 1966, the statute was amended to read:
"A child cannot he adopted without the consen:
of each living parent having rights in relation t·
said child.... "
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Appellant contends tha;t ithe amendment conferred
upon the father of an illegitimate child the right to consent
to tile adoption of that child. The respondent conrtends that
the amendment merely restated the law, as it has always
existed in this State. The statute, as amended, is ambiguous, and since no legislative history can be found to enlicrllten U·S as to the legislative intent behind the amendmcnt, it becomes the duty of this Court to construe the
amendment consistent ·with public policy.
b

The key to understanding the amendment is the phrase,
"each living parent haV1ing rights in relation to Mid child."
Who is a parent in this context, and whwt is the nature
of the rights possessed by such a parent? Do&<> this statute
deal with four people, the father and mother of a legitimate
child and the father and mother of an illegitimate child,
or only with three people, the father and mother of a legitimate child and tihe mOlthe•r of an illegitimate cMld? The
English case of Re M, (1955) 2 Q. B. 479, (1955) 3 Week
L. R. 320, 51 A. L. R. 2d 488, is almost precisely :in point.
The statute construed by the English Court of Appeal in
that case required for adoption the consent "of every person or body who is a parent or guardian of the infant or
irho is liable by virtue of an order or agreement Ito contribute to the maintenance of the infant." The Court held
that the word "parent" in an act of Parliament does not
include the father of an illegitimate child, unlest:S the context otherwise requires.
Prior to the rewording of Section 78-30-4, it was clear

that the only father having rights in his child was the
father of a legitimate chi'ld.
"The putative father of an illegirtimate chilrJ
occupies no recognized parternal status at common
law or under our statutes. The law does not recog.
nize Mm art all, ,except that it will make him Pav
for rthe dhil.d's maintenance if it can find out
he is. The only father it reoognizes as having am
rights is the farther of a legitimate ch!ild." 12 Utali
2d at 239.
1

Since the law wa'.S clear that the father of an illegitimate
chiild didn't occupy parentail status in relation to thait child
and didn't have any rights in re1wtion to thwt child, it
perfectly consis,tent for the Legislarture to use the language,,
"each living parent having rights in relartion to said child."
This phrase covered only those persons who occupied rec·
ognized pa'l'ental startus, namely the father and mother of
a 'legitimarte chiiJd and ithe mother of an illegitimate child.
It is a settled rule of startulbory construction that a word may
take a particular meaning according to the context ana
subject matter of the statute in which it is used. Am. Jur.,
Statutes §§ 24 7 and 292. If ,the Legislature had intendeil
to change the law and include the faJther of an Hleg]timak
chiM as a "parent" whose consent was necessary, then the
lJegis1}'aiture w10uld have done so in clear, unequivocal Jan·
guage. The 1966 amendment of Section 78-30-4 was no!
intended to confer any rights thart had niot existed pred·
ously. The word "parent," as msred in the amendment, re
fers only to the mother and father of a legitimate chila
and the mother of an megirtiimate child. In the context 01
78-30-4, the fafuer of an iHegii·tima'tJe child is not a "parent."
1

The trend in the law is to eliminate all distinction between legitimate and illegitimaJte children. Possibly the
reason for rewording the statute in question here was to
eliminate the word "illegitimate" therefrom. The law has
rightfully recognized that classificwtions which deprive the
illeg·itilnate child of rights enjoyed by the legitimate child
·;in\R.te equal protection of the laws. However, giving the
illegitimate child the rights in relation 1Jo his natural father
that the legitimate child has in relation to his natural father
doesn't necessarily mean that the father of an illegitimate
child is being endowed with the same rights as the father
of R- legitimate child.*
Good reasons exist for conferring upon the illegitimate
child the same rights enjoyed by the legitimate child, but
for sound public policy reasons the father of an illegitimate child should not enjoy the same rights in relation to
his child as the father of a legitimate child does to his. The
law favors making children legitimate and encourages action designed to effectuate this result. To recognize the
natural father of an illegitimate child as one having rights
in relation to such child, even though through legal process,
rnluntary or involuntary, the man has not legitimated the
child, would be to grant the man the rights of parenthood
1dthout shackling him with any of the responsibilities. In
'Illegitimate children can now maintain an action for their mother's
wrongful death, (Leuy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 [ 1968]), and the
mother of an illegitimate child can maintain an action for the child's
wrongful death (Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co.,
391 U. S. 73, [ 1968]). However, the father of an illegitimate child
should not be allowed to acknowledge the child after its death and
bring a wrongful death action under the Glona doctrine.
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such a situation the man could refuse to comsent to tiJ1
adoption of the child on one hand and on the other refusf
to suppor.t the child himself since he would be under n
legal obl:igation to do so. Such a policy would be sociall\
unwise and extremely disquieting to the adoptive and pros.
pective parents in this State.
1

The father of an illegitimate child has no rights in the
child.
"The mother of an illegitimate child ha-q bo!f1
rights and obligations toward'.S it . . . The fathrr
af a bastard, however, has under our law no right1
in respect of it at all and to the best of my beliei
he never has h ad." Re M, 51 A. L. R. 2d at 495.
1

'Ilhe above quoted language accurately states the law on
this issue in the State of Utah. See Thomas v. Children's
Aid of Ogden, supra. About the only rights which
father of an illegitimaJte ch:ild has in relation to such
child are rights of visifation, and these rights are subject
to the best interests and welfare of the child. See 15 A. L
R. 3rd 887. The cases which speak of the father's right
in his illegitimate chiid as being paramount to all the work
except 1fue mdther's are cases in whioh the father sough:
custody of rthe child. Slee Harrison v. Harker, suprn
In the situation where the falther want'S to take his illegiti·
mate child intJo his home and support it, and in effect Jegiti·
mate it his right to do so should supersede the rights ol
any other person or organization, except the child's mother
provided it is in the best interest of the child. But the
Staite of Utah is firmly committed to the rule that the
welfave of the child outweighs the legal rights of his W
1
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ents. See Harrison V. Harker, supra. In the present case
appcllarnt sough:t custody of his illegitimaite daughter, but
Judg-e Garff decided it would be in the bestt interest of the
child to place her in the custody of the Division of Family
Serrices. Whatever rights appellant may have had in his
illegitimate daughter in this case, they were subordinate
to the best interests of the child.
Respondent requests this Court to construe Utah Code
Annotated, 78-30-4, as amended, as merely a restatement
of the Jaw as announced by this Court in Thomas v. Child;m's A1:d Society of Ogden, supra. If the father of an
illegitima:te child wants to become a parent having legal
rights in relation to tha:t child, let him legitimate the child
and assume the concommitarnt parental duties. The legal
rights of parenthood are and should be inseparably connected with its legal duties and responsibilities.
C. APPELLANT DID NOT LEGITIMATE
BABY GIRL McMURTREY UNDER THE
LEGITIMATION ST AT UTE IS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
Utah has three legitimation statutes. Utah Code Annotated 77-60-14 legitimates the child when the parents
many after the child's birth. Utah Code Ann. 74-4-10
legitimizes the child for purposes of inheritance. Utah
Code Ann. 78-30-12 legitimates the child for all purposes,
if 'the natural father publicly acknowledges the child, takes
it into his family, and treats it as a legitimate child. Appellant cla'ims that his acknowledgmen't of Baby Girl McMu1ircy should have legitimated the child since he was
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prevented from complying with the other conditions set
out in the statute. The law, however, rs clearly againit
appellant on this pc>int. In order to legitimate an illegit.
mate chHd, the technical requiremenits of the legitimatini
statute must be srtriotly followed. Utah's statute require:
acknowledgment, plus taking the child into the family, pJu,
treating it ais a legi1timate child. See In re Carr's Estalf.
31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757 (1906). Failure to comply with al
three conditions resuLts in the chHd remaiirring illegitimat>
even though the natural father des/ires to legitimate it a11,;
tries to comply with all the necessary statutory condition;
but is prevented from doing so. See In re Adoption 0
Irby, 37 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1964).
It may be unfortunate that the State of Utah doesn
have a legitimation statute similar to that of Arizona whid
makes
cMldren the legirtJimate chlildren of their natura:

parents. The acknowledgment of an illegitimate child br
its
father would then be all that is necessary t·
legitimalte the child. Requ:iring the father to take the ch.ii
into his home in addi'ti:on to the acknowledgment will resul'
in .the children remaining iHegirtimate contrary to the in·
tention of the par!!Jies and in most instances contrary to !ht
intterest of the State. Some examples of situations whet'
the child will not be legitimated even though all
desire to confer
status on the child are: (1)
the present siltuation, where the father is prevented from
taking the child into his home, (2) where the
married and his Wife refuses to consent to having th,
1

child in the home, (3) where the father i1s unma!IT'ied and

has no home to take the child into, and ( 4) where the
mother, who has priior right to the lega:l custody of the
child, refuses to allow the father to take the child into his
home.
Serious questions now exist as to how a child can be

,

Jeg-itimate in Utah for purposes other than inheritance
where the parents of the child do not marry and where the
father acknowledges the child as his own but does not take
it into his family. However, respondent must assert that

Utah Code Ann. 78-30-12 is clear in requiring acknowledgment plus the other conditions, and any change based on
social considerations would probably come from the Legislature rather than by forc ing upon the present statute a
1

meaning which its clear wording will not accommodate.
CONCLUSION
A man who begets an iHegitimarte child and does not

legitima:te that child is not a "parent" having the right to
consent to the adoption of that child under the common law
1

and &tatutes of the State of Utah. Appell:ant's efforlfJs to
legitima:te Ms daughter were insufficiient under the legitimation statutes of the StaJte of Utah. The best interests
of the child predominate over any rights of its parenits,

and under the facits and circumstances of this case, Judge
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Garff acted wfilihin his authority when he terminated
pellant's parenta!l rights.
Respectfully submitted,
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Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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